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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO
THE JURY DUE TO INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AN
INSUFFICIENT JURY INSTRUCTION

The State argues that Clegg's assertion that the trial court erroneously omitted the
complete statutory definition of theft by deception guts the statutory language of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-6-401(5) since applying Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 would
render the first two elements of § 76-6-401(5) superfluous (Br. of App. at 12-13). The
State's definition, however, ignores the statutory elements of theft by deception and
ignores Clegg's affirmative defense which was raised at trial.
Under the State's interpretation of theft by deception, it is not § 76-6-40 l(5)(a)
that is rendered superfluous and inoperative; rather, § 76-6-405(2) would be rendered
inoperative. The State attempts to completely ignore the mandatory statutory language
that theft by deception "does not occur, however, when there is only ... puffing by
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statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed...." U.C.A. § 766-405(2). It is the plain and unambiguous statutory language that demands that the full
definition of theft by deception encompasses both § 76-6-405 and § 76-6-401, which
should be read together. The State even concedes that the definition of theft by deception
encompasses both subsection (1) and (2) of § 76-6-405 and § 76-6-401(5) (Br. of App. at
3).
The State attempts to confuse the real issue by asserting that only § 76-6-401(5)
and § 76-6-405(1) are applicable and as long as those elements are satisfied, the crime is
complete. Clearly, the legislature intended that even if a defendant knowingly creates a
false impression (to which Clegg vigorously denies he did), "theft by deception does not
occur" if those statements are "unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group
addressed." U.C.A. § 76-6-405(2) (emphasis added). The State's argument ignores the
law and is without merit.
Moreover, Clegg reiterates that his conduct did not meet any of the elements of
theft by deception because he did not knowingly create a false impression—he believed
that the price card he presented to the cashier was for the only item he wanted to
purchase.
The record indicates that Clegg testified that he removed a price card that he found
on the shelf near a sprinkler adaptor he wanted to buy and brought the card with him to
expedite his checkout (R. 203:168, 178, 181-82). In addition, testimony from Marketti, a
Wal-Mart employee, confirmed that the price card was on the shelf above the sprinkler
adapter that Clegg wanted to purchase and that Clegg could conceivably have taken the
2

card from between the shelves, thinking it applied to the adapter (Id. at 71, 148). Clegg
further testified that while he was speaking with the cashier he grabbed the items that he
had taken out of packages, handed them to the cashier, and told her that he didn't want
them and they would need to be restocked (R. 204:170). Although many witnesses
testified that they were able to see what happened at the checkout stand, there are only
two people who could testify about what was actually said at the checkout stand—the
cashier and Clegg. The cashier admitted in her testimony that she was sidetracked and
nervous during this transaction, (R. 203: 125), which makes her testimony unreliable.
Further, the State claims that Clegg misinterpreted the statutory phrase, "likely to
affect the judgment of another in the transaction," by assuming that the response of the
cashier in the transaction defines his culpability for a deception, regardless of his intent or
conduct (Br. of App. at 13). The State further claims that the testimony presented by all
of the witnesses established a close connection between Clegg's falsehood and the
transaction. Clegg disagrees with this claim and relies upon the facts stated above and in
his original brief.
In State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah App. 1992), this Court noted, "[t]he sole
purpose of section 76-6-401 is to define those words or actions that may be considered a
'deception.' As such, the language 'and is likely to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction' is meant only to test the relationship between the falsehood and the
transaction, so as to determine if a deception exists. If a deception is found, it must then
be considered whether there was reliance, i.e., whether obtaining or improperly
controlling another's property was accomplished 'by deception."' Id. at 686, n 9.
3

In State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court reasoned,
"[i]t is clear from the face of the statute that reliance by the victim is an element of the
crime of theft by deception. In context, obtaining property 'by deception' can only mean
'by means of deception.' Deception, followed by transfer of property to the deceiver,
does not add up to theft by deception without the causal element of reliance. Even though
the alleged victim is deceived, if he does not rely on the deception in parting with his
property, there has been no theft 'by deception."' (Citations omitted).
In LeFevre, this Court noted, "neither section 76-6-405 nor section 76-6-410
requires, in so many words, that the State show the victim relied upon the defendant's
deception. Nonetheless, courts have generally treated reliance as an implicit element of
the offense of theft by deception, i.e., theft by means of deception." 825 P.2d at 687. The
real issue is what level of reliance must be shown.
In State v. Schneider, 715 P.2d 297 (Ariz. App. 1986), the court adopted a
"materiality" test for reliance, stating:
The deceit must be "material" to constitute the offense, in the sense that it must be
a significant factor in the transaction . . . . Materiality seems to require that the
victim to some extent must believe the pretense to be true, but the greater focus is
the objective issue of whether the misrepresentation was instrumental in effecting
transfer of [property].
Id. (quoting R. Gerber, Criminal Law of Arizona 249 (1978)).
According to this standard, the misrepresentation does not have to be the only, or
even the controlling, factor in the victim's decision to part with his or her property.
4

Instead, the Schneider test appears to permit a finding of sufficient reliance so long as the
defendant's misrepresentation constituted a substantial causal influence upon the victim's
decision.
In LeFevre, this Court concluded, "the Schneider test establishes the appropriate
level of reliance necessary to sustain a conviction for theft by deception." 825 P.2d at
690. Applying the above analysis to the facts of the instant case, insufficient evidence
was presented to support the jury's finding. Specifically, Clegg asserts that he made an
offer on the price of the item when the price card was presented to the cashier; and that
offer was accepted by the cashier (R. 204: 257-59). The cashier was not to take Clegg's
word for the value of the items. In fact, she had been specifically trained not to do so but
failed in her responsibility to do a price check on the items that did not have UPC codes
on them. Because she had been trained to not rely on a customer's price quote, especially
when there is no UPC codes, her reliance was inappropriate.
In any event, Clegg asserts that there was no deception on his part during the
transaction and therefore, there was no need to look at the cashier's reliance on his
statements. For the above reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, his
conviction should be reversed.
IL

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE COMPLETE STATUTORY
DEFINITION OF THEFT BY DECEPTION.

The State claims this case does not involve "puffing," because Clegg was the
buyer, not the seller and because Clegg did not exaggerate the price. The State, however,
cites no authority that puffing can only occur by a seller, and not by a buyer.
5

Clegg agrees that there are Utah cases that show that the person doing the
"puffing" happens to be the seller. However, in this case, Clegg's statements most
certainly were "puffing" because the price he suggested to the cashier was his opinion
and a general estimate. Because his conduct was "puffing," Clegg asserts that the jury
should have been instructed on the complete statutory definition of theft by deception.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN HIS
COMMENTS TO THE JURY CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S
EMPLOYMENT AND IN ADMONISHING THE DEFENDANT IN
FRONT OF THE JURY.

Clegg disagrees with the State's claims and relies upon the arguments stated in his
original brief.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Clegg asks
this Court to reverse his conviction of theft by deception.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August 2005.
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